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, YES; INTERVENTION IN SYRIA, NO: 
DECIPHERING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Amos N. Guiora† 
Deciphering an American presidential administration is truly yeo-
man’s work. It is still too early to judge whether the Obama Administration 
is significantly distinct from previous administrations. Arguably, the task 
should be left to historians. Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of President 
Obama’s Middle East policy (perhaps best described as ‘policy’) reflects a 
combination of naiveté, inconsistency and murkiness. While perhaps by 
design, the impact—on the ground—is deeply troublesome. While domestic 
political considerations are a reality, the implications of the Administra-
tion’s policy in an area of the world as treacherous as the Middle East are, 
potentially, staggering. 
Precisely because international law does not articulate either nor-
mative or architectural standards as to when international humanitarian 
intervention is justified, national leaders arguably have a responsibility to 
act. The oft-cited phrase “when the cannons roar, the muses are silent” is 
particularly relevant to this discussion. For a variety of reasons, the inter-
national community has determined—whether actively or passively—that 
the massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad government does not 
justify international humanitarian intervention. While the human rights vio-
lations occurring on a daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda, 
Kosovo, or Sierra Leone they are not less compelling than the events tran-
spiring in Libya. If, by metaphorical analogy, the international community 
is the cannons and the U.S. is the muse; does that mean that the Obama 
Administration is required to be silent? After all, if the quote were to be 
rigorously applied, then many of the institutions created to minimize human 
suffering would neither exist, much less function in wartime. While the dis-
tinction—from the perspective of international humanitarian intervention—
  
  Gadhafi was killed in his hometown of Sirte in October 2010. Neil MacFarquhar, An 
Erratic Leader, Brutal and Defiant until the End, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A16. 
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between Libya and Syria is as unclear as the criteria that justifies interven-
tion; that must not serve as a misguided basis for the Obama Administration 
to largely turn its back on the Syrian people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Deciphering an American presidential administration is truly yeo-
man’s work. Whether the Obama Administration is significantly distinct 
from previous administrations is too early to judge. Arguably, the task 
should be left to historians. Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of President 
Obama’s Middle East policy (perhaps best described as ‘policy’) reflects a 
combination of naiveté, inconsistency and murkiness.1 While perhaps by 
design, the impact—on the ground—is deeply troublesome. While domestic 
political considerations are a reality, the implications of the Administra-
tion’s policy in an area of the world as treacherous as the Middle East are, 
potentially, staggering.2 
President Obama’s policy (assuming a coherent policy exists) has 
been particularly problematic on two distinct fronts: inconsistency in deter-
mining under what conditions intervention is justified and a sharp disso-
nance between suggested expectations and actual delivery.3 The latter is 
  
 1 Compare Douglas J. Feith & Seth Cropsey, The Obama Doctrine Defined, COMMENT., 
July–Aug. 2011, at 11, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-
obama-doctrine-defined/ (“The United States under Barack Obama is less assertive, less 
dominant, less power-minded, less focused on the American people’s particular interests, and 
less concerned about preserving U.S. freedom of action.”), with Fareed Zakaria, Should U.S. 
Foreign Policy Be One-Size-Fits-All?, CNN (July 10, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs. 
cnn.com/2011/07/10/should-u-s-foreign-policy-be-one-size-fits-all/ (discussing consistency 
in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East).  
 2 See Barbara Slavin, Keeping up with Mideast Changes, NEW ATLANTICIST: POL’Y AND 
ANALYSIS BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/keeping-mideast-
changes?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+new_ 
atlanticist+%28New+Atlanticist%29 (providing an alternative analysis on the political con-
siderations of the Middle East).  
 3 See Glenn Greenwald, U.S. More Unpopular in the Arab World than Under Bush, 
SALON (July 13, 2011, 8:14 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/middle_east/index.html? 
story=/opinion/greenwald/2011/07/13/arabs (stating “anti-American sentiment is now at 
dangerously—even unprecedentedly—high levels.”).  
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most clearly demonstrated both in the President’s Cairo speech4 and his 
May 19, 2011 talk in which he called on Israel to return to the 1967 (pre Six 
Day War) borders.5 In the former, President Obama overtly suggested a 
distinct change forthcoming in U.S. policy regarding the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict; the failure to ‘deliver’ has led to extraordinary disappointment 
amongst Palestinians who assumed change was in the offing.6 Arguably, the 
Palestinian demand for declaration of Palestinian statehood by the U.N. 
General Assembly is a direct result of disappointment with the President’s 
failure to ‘deliver’ the suggested change. 
With respect to the second example, the President’s speech reflect-
ed the oft-used expression in college basketball referring to a student-athlete 
who leaves college after his freshman year for the NBA: “one and done.”7 
Simply put: the President’s speech was absolutely lacking in any follow-up8 
as neither details nor the identity of a new Peace Negotiator9 were revealed. 
That lack of detail, particularly in the aftermath of the Cairo and Washing-
ton, D.C. speeches, which hinted at significant policy movement and direc-
tion, has directly contributed to inconsistent policy articulation and devel-
opment. That inconsistency is particularly evident when comparing the de-
cision to intervene militarily in Libya10 with the decision to not intervene in 
Syria. 
While perhaps the inconsistency is predicated on careful geo-
political analysis, the Administration’s actions raise questions regarding the 
essence of intervention, regardless of whether it is predicated on military or 
  
 4 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning at Cairo Uni-
versity (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter New Beginning Speech] (discussing a “new beginning” 
between Muslims and the U.S.) 
 5 President Barack Obama, Speech on the Middle East (May 19, 2011) [hereinafter Mid-
dle East Speech]. 
 6 See, e.g.,  Dan Ephron, The Wrath of Mahmoud Abbas, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 24, 2011, 
10:26 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/04/25/mahmoud-abbas-interview-
palestinian-leaders-frustration-with-obama.html (stating that President Obama, “who seemed 
open to helping the Palestinian cause before his election, quickly cooled once he got into 
office—and at a crucial moment, betrayed [Mahmoud Abbas].”). 
 7 Middle East Speech, supra note 5 (discussing negotiations for “a viable Palestine, a 
secure Israel.”).  
 8 The speech he gave at AIPAC on May 22, 2011 does not qualify as follow-up. See 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the AIPAC Policy Conference 2011 
(May 22, 2011). 
 9 According to unconfirmed press reports, previous Peace Negotiator George Mitchell’s 
retirement was largely owing to his frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. See 
Nathan Guttman, Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, Amid Frustration, Turf Wars, 
THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (May 13, 2011), http://www.forward.com/articles/137797/.  
 10 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011) (discussing the concern for limiting refugee flows into Tunisia and 
Egypt, while refraining from a direct attack against Gadhafi).  
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humanitarian considerations. It is essential to underscore that intervention—
the theme of this essay—defines the historic relationship between Western 
powers and the Middle East. A brief historical recounting of that specific 
relationship is telling; however, it is important to add that Western interven-
tion has largely defined the relationship between the West and non-Western 
peoples in general. 
To facilitate an understanding of the Obama Administration’s Mid-
dle East policy through the lens of the intervention/non-intervention dilem-
ma, this article will be divided as follows: Section Two is a brief survey of 
Western intervention in the Middle East; Section Three is a survey of recent 
Middle East events; Section Four is an analysis of U.S. policy in Libya and 
Syria; Section Five is a discussion of the law of international humanitarian 
intervention; and Section Six is ‘Looking Forward’. 
II. INTERVENTION: A BRIEF SURVEY 
Whether through colonization, military, or humanitarian interven-
tion, Western intervention in the Middle East has, in many ways, defined 
the relationship between the West and the Middle East. At one time or an-
other Western powers have had a significant presence in Palestine (British 
Palestine Mandate, 1917–1948),11 Lebanon (France 1920–1946; U.S. 
1958),12 Syria (France 1920–1946),13 Jordan/Transjordan (U.K. 1922–
1946),14 Libya (France 1942–1951),15 Iran (U.K. 1941–1945),16 Iraq (British 
Mandate of Mesopotamia 1920–1932,17 U.S. 2003–present),18 Afghanistan 
  
 11 A History of Conflict, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/ 
v3_ip_timeline/html/1917.stm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012); A History of Conflict, BBC, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/1948.stm (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2012).  
 12 Mitchell Bard, Modern Lebanon, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtual 
library.org/jsource/arabs/modleb.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012); Timeline: Lebanon, BBC 
NEWS (July 13, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/819200.stm (providing a time-
line of Lebanon’s history from 1920 to June 2011).  
 13 Timeline: Syria, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/ 
827580.stm (providing a timeline of Syria’s history from 1918 to August 2011).  
 14 Background Note: Jordan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm (providing information regarding Jordan’s geography, people and histo-
ry).  
 15 Timeline: Libya, BBC NEWS (May 21, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1398 
437.stm (providing a timeline of Libya’s history from 7th Century BC through October 
2011).  
 16 Background Note: Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (providing information about Iran’s geography, history and government).  
 17 David R. Woodward, The Middle East During World War One, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/middle_east_01.shtml (providing a 
timeline of key events in the Middle East during and after World War One).  
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(U.K. 1839–1919, U.S.S.R. 1980–1989, U.S. 2001–present),19 and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates (U.K. 1819–1968).20 The principle of intervention raises 
profound questions regarding both the limits of national sovereignty and 
articulation of national self-interest.21 Needless to say, what is defined as 
intervention can also be described as imperialism (as evidenced in many of 
the aforementioned cases of Western intervention in the Middle East); after 
all, Western powers have historically perceived Middle East oil and trade 
routes as essential to their national interests and have, therefore, imposed 
themselves on indigenous populations.22 
The historical basis for Western imperialism was, largely, a combi-
nation of: availability of much needed natural resources; cheap labor; geo-
politics; and Christian missionaries.23 The result was both taking (natural 
resources) and purported giving (Christianity and democratic values).24 The 
intended beneficiary was the Western power; in large part, the indigenous 
people were enormously victimized. That said, some have suggested West-
ern powers also contributed to local cultures by introducing democratic val-
ues and traditions, but the grim tale of post-colonial Africa suggests a sig-
nificantly different reality. 
One of the clear results of World War II is the dusk that settled on 
traditional Western powers; while the sun (as the expression went) never set 
on the British Empire, since World War II, the U.K. has become almost 
exclusively domestic-focused (this incorporates the ‘troubles’ in Northern 
Ireland) and France has largely disengaged (following withdrawals from 
Algeria, Vietnam and Lebanon) from any international involvement. The 
post-World War II dawn was largely dominated by the Cold War (until the 
  
 18 Iraq Timeline, BBC NEWS (May 21, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 
737483.stm (providing a timeline of key events in Iraqi history from 1534 through April 
2011).  
 19 Afghanistan—Timeline, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/116210 
8.stm (providing a timeline of Afghanistan’s history from 1919 to February 2011); Back-
ground Note: Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (providing information regarding Afghanistan’s geography, population 
and history).  
 20 Background Note: United Arab Emirates, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm (providing information regarding the history, 
population and geography of the United Arab Emirates).  
 21 Marc Trachtenberg, Intervention in Historical Perspective, in 1 EMERGING NORMS OF 
JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 7, 8 (Carl Kaysen & Laura Reed, eds., 1993) (discussing foreign 
state intervention in the “internal affairs of independent states . . . .”).  
 22 For more on imperialism, see David Anderson, It’s Not Just Kenya. Squaring Up to the 
Seamier Side of Empire is Long Overdue, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2011), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/25/kenya-empire-mau-mau-britain?INTCMP= 
SRCH.  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (until its fall in 
1991) largely ‘divided’ the world into two (with the exception of non-
aligned nations) spheres of influence with extraordinary, but ultimately re-
strained, competition for geo-political gains. 
From an American perspective, the desire to achieve a particular re-
gional gain often resulted in the U.S. supporting unsavory regimes and lead-
ers25 for the sole purpose of denying the Soviet Union a perceived gain.26 In 
the Cold War context, “victory” was piecemeal (if at all), largely limited by 
the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and mainly devoid of 
principle other than perceived gain (however defined) at the expense of the 
other side.  
The obsession with the other side led both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to 
costly military interventions; Brezhnev’s decision to invade Afghanistan 
(1979)27 was arguably the beginning of the end of the U.S.S.R., and the 
Kennedy-Johnson28 decision to deploy the U.S. military to Vietnam (early 
1960’s) continues to have a dramatic impact on the U.S. budget, psyche and 
armed forces. In both cases, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. intervened in a conflict 
that was ‘not theirs.’ Soldiers were sent to countries whose language, cul-
ture and conflict were foreign to the ordinary soldier, whose mission (other 
than to stay alive) was unarticulated beyond vague and confused rhetoric. 
Unfortunately, the vagueness of overseas missions continues to 
haunt U.S. policy makers to this day: a talk before cadets at the U.S. Mili-
tary Academy29 reinforced that the mission in Iraq30 was as unclear and 
vague to today’s military officers as it was to their predecessors in Vietnam 
  
 25 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s oft-cited phrase referring to a Latin America dictator, 
“[h]e may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch,” is particularly apt in this context; 
arguably, that philosophy continues to define U.S. relations with world leaders. See THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 268 (Hugh Rawson & Margaret Miner eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (1997). 
 26 See generally JAMES M. SCOTT, DECIDING TO INTERVENE: THE REAGAN DOCTRINE AND 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1996) (noting the Reagan Doctrine and the push to keep gains 
from the Soviet Union through interventions in Nicaragua, Iran, Angola, and El Salvador).  
 27 See The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs, in 2 
AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM THE LAST WAR (Svetlana Savranskaya ed., 2001), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/ (explaining that fears that Afghan 
Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin would turn towards the U.S., as Egyptian President Sadat 
had previously done, helped fuel the decision to invade Afghanistan). 
 28 See generally WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH 332 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., 2d 
ed. 2008) (explaining some of the repercussions of the Vietnam War still experienced in the 
United States today). 
 29 I was greatly honored by an invitation to speak at the U.S. Military Academy in No-
vember, 2005.  
 30 Many of the cadets I spoke to would later be tasked with commanding ground forces in 
Iraq.   
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a mere forty years earlier.31 Doubtlessly, a similar talk to Soviet cadets in 
1980 would have resulted in the same ambiguity regarding their mission in 
Afghanistan; that conflict, ultimately, demonstrated the Red Army was little 
more than a brutal paper tiger.32 
That said, military intervention can also occur for humanitarian 
purposes; NATO intervention (albeit after much tragedy and atrocity) in the 
former Yugoslavia is a clear example,33 as is U.S. intervention in Haiti.34 
The philosophy behind humanitarian intervention is simple: it stems from 
the principle that “intervention for human protection purposes . . . is sup-
portable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently appre-
hended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or 
is itself the perpetrator.”35 In other words, humanitarian intervention is 
based on the belief that “when a government turns savagely upon its own 
people . . .” it becomes the responsibility of “[a]ny state capable of stopping 
the slaughter . . . to try to do so.”36  
Despite the relatively recent use of the term “humanitarian interven-
tion,” modern history is replete with examples of such intervention. Some of 
the earliest occurrences of humanitarian intervention extend back to the 
nineteenth century, with the notable interventions by the United Kingdom, 
France, and Russia in Syria, Naples, and Greece to prevent local govern-
ments from murdering citizens of the respective countries.37 Since that time 
period, other notable humanitarian interventions include Belgian interven-
tion in the Congo (1960),38 French intervention in Central Africa (1979),39 
  
 31 See J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER 106–07, 110 (1966) (“In 
Vietnam the United States is fighting virtually alone and for vague purposes in a war which 
is not an international conflict but an insurrection in one part of a divided country supported 
by the other part.”). 
 32 That “spirit” of brutality largely defines the conduct of the Russian Army in the Chech-
nya conflict. AMOS N. GUIORA, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTERTERRORISM 74–81 (Aspen 
Publishers, 2nd ed. 2011). 
 33 See Ian Bankroft, Serbia’s Anniversary is a Timely Reminder, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo. 
 34 See Douglas Jehl, Mission to Haiti: In Washington; Clinton Says U.S. Will Deter Abuses 
by Haiti Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/22/world/ 
mission-to-haiti-in-washington-clinton-says-us-will-deter-abuses-by-haiti-police.html?scp= 
4&sq=haiti+&st=nyt.  
 35 INT’L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 16 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
 36 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 101, 108 (4th ed. 2006). 
 37 PETER MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE USE OF FORCE 8 (1993). 
 38 INT’L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 49–51 (2001). 
 39 Id. at 63–64. 
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U.S. intervention in Somalia (1992–1993),40 and the previously cited NATO 
intervention in the former Yugoslavia (1999).41  
III. THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY 
In the not too distant past, the term “Middle East” referred to a lim-
ited number of countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia and Syria. Today, the term incorporates an extraordinary 
broad swath of land stretching from the edge of North Africa to the ‘tradi-
tional’ Middle East, to the Persian Gulf, to Turkey, to the Caucus Moun-
tains, to Afghanistan and possibly Pakistan.42 From a geographical perspec-
tive this ‘crescent’ (the reference is to physical parameters only) is the new 
Middle East that includes 4.34% of the earth’s physical territory43 and 
3.35% of the world’s population.44 Included in this crescent are a significant 
number of contemporary national and international conflicts such as those 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, the civil war in Libya,45 the massacre of Syrian citi-
zens by the Syrian government,46 the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict,47 
unrest in Yemen,48 riots in Jordan,49 and Iran’s attempts to join the club of 
  
 40 Id. at 94. 
 41 Id. at 89–94.  
 42 What is the Middle East?, TEACHMIDEAST, http://teachmideast.org/essays/27-geography 
/51-what-is-the-middle-east (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (explaining the expansion of the Mid-
dle East). 
 43 The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
rankorder/2147rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (demonstrating that the Middle East 
comprises 6,468,951 square km to be compared to the Earth’s total 148,940,000 square km). 
 44 2011 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU 7–8 (2011), 
http://www.prb.org/pdf11/2011population-data-sheet_eng.pdf (presenting the Middle East’s 
population of approximately 238,000,000 to be compared with the world’s total population 
of  roughly seven billion). 
 45 See C.J. Chivers, Libyan Rebels Gain Inches Toward Link to Tripoli, N.Y. TIMES (July 
6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/world/africa/07rebels.html?_r=1&ref=world. 
 46 See generally Deborah Jerome, Syrian Regime’s Unsteady Hand, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (July 6, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrian-regimes-unsteady-hand/p25429 
(providing background of the massacre of Syrian citizens by the Syrian government); see 
also Anthony Shadid, Restive City of Hama Tests Will of Syrian Government, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html?pagewan 
ted=all 
 47 Concrete International Intervention Needed in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict—UN Envoy, 
UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37614 
&Cr=Palestin&Cr1# (noting the need to continue peace talks in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict). 
 48 Including the emergence of al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula and the threat it poses both to 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia; to that end, the US has defined the head of AQAP, Nasir al-
Wuhayshi, as a legitimate target and has reportedly conducted drone attacks targeting AQAP 
operatives in Yemen. AQAP Leader Killed in U.S. Drone Attack in Yemen, YEMEN POST, 
http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=4180&MainCat=3 (last updated 
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nuclear nations (which, includes, in this broadened region: Israel, Pakistan, 
and India).50 
This short list does not include—arguably—the most dramatic 
event of the past year: the so-called “Arab Spring,”51 particularly the dra-
matic resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and the resulting uncertainty 
regarding the future face of Egypt. While elections previously scheduled for 
September 2011 have been postponed to the late fall,52 it is an open question 
whether they will be held and how the domestic political map of the Arab 
world’s largest country will be re-aligned. One of the most important, albeit 
unanswered, questions is the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood53 and its 
impact both domestically and with respect to the Egyptian-Israel Peace 
Treaty.54 While some commentators were extraordinarily optimistic in the 
wake of Mubarak’s downfall,55 others suggested a “wait and see” attitude,56 
  
Oct. 15, 2011) (documenting U.S. drone attacks that killed eight AQAP members in Azzan, 
Shabwa). 
 49 See generally Ranya Kadri, Ethan Bronner & Thom Shanker, Riot Police In Jordan 
Clear Camp Of Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A8 (discussing the Jordan riots and 
their background). 
 50 See Iran’s Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html; David E. Sanger 
& William J. Broad, Survivor of Attack Accelerates Iran’s Effort to Produce Nuclear Mate-
rial, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at A4 (describing Iran’s intention to triple its fuel produc-
tion, putting it closer to bomb construction). 
 51 See generally Jack A. Goldstone, Understanding the Revolutions of 2011, 90 FOREIGN 
AFF. 8 (2011) (discussing the “Arab Spring” and Middle Eastern autocracies, and expressing 
optimism for democracy’s development in the region). 
 52 See Mariam Fam & Abdel Latif Wahba, Egypt Postpones Elections, Purges Police 
Following Protests, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-
13/egypt-postpones-elections-purges-police-following-protests.html. 
 53 See Anthony Shadid, Egypt’s Islamists Show Their Might in Numbers, Demanding 
Religious Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, at A4 (describing the sudden rise of Islamism in 
Egypt, and noting the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence among a spectrum of religious move-
ments). 
 54 Camp David Accords, 17 I.L.M. 1463, 1466–74,  (September 17, 1978) available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Ac
cords.htm; See Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Israel-Egypt, 17 I.L.M. 362, 362–66, 
(Mar. 26, 1979) available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20 
to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Egypt%20Peace%20Treaty. 
 55 See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, We Are All Egyptians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at A23 
(quoting several wounded, yet optimistic, protestors who continued to stand against the Mu-
barak regime). 
 56 See Richard N. Haass, The Arab Spring Has Given Way to a Long, Hot Summer, FIN. 
TIMES (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/arab-spring-has-given-
way-long-hot-summer/p25426?cid=rss-fullfeed-the_arab_spring_has_given_way_070611 
&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr_main+%28
CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29 (assessing the current state of Middle Eastern countries 
and the need for onlookers to allow time to pass to determine the outcome). 
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particularly given Egypt’s importance, extending beyond its enormous mili-
tary.57  
In addition, a number of regional (broadly defined) hotspots deserve 
careful vigilance by U.S. policymakers; in particular, Pakistan, whose du-
plicitous “double game” is of particular concern.58 While ostensibly an 
American ally, the Pakistani government59 provided Osama Bin Laden with 
“cover”; the fact that the U.S. apparently did not notify Pakistan of the im-
pending violation of Pakistani sovereignty is indicative of the Obama Ad-
ministration’s—justified—deep mistrust of Islamabad. This is particularly 
troublesome for all the obvious reasons: many terrorist attacks that occur in 
India are Pakistani linked, funded, and supported;60 northwest Pakistan is a 
Taliban stronghold and significant concerns rightly exist regarding the secu-
rity of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal should the regime fall.  
Similarly, concerns have been raised regarding Turkey; a mere 
glance at a map of the world reinforces the extraordinary geo-political sig-
nificance of the country that straddles Europe and Asia. The domestic push 
and pull regarding ‘Turkey to where’ was exacerbated by the European Un-
ion’s short-sighted decision to deny Turkey membership;61 an increasing 
look to the Arab world was the inevitable result. President Erdogan’s re-
election62 suggested Turkey’s further distancing from Europe and the U.S. 
in part because of President Obama’s criticism of significant Turkish in-
  
 57 See generally  Egypt Military Strength Detail by the Numbers, GLOBALFIREPOWER.COM, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Egypt (last 
updated June 30, 2011) (providing general information regarding Egypt’s military might); 
For comparison purposes, see 2011 World Military Strength Ranking, GLOBALFIREPOWER.C 
OM http://www.globalfirepower.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (ranking of global military 
powers, Egypt ranks 16, Saudi Arabia ranks 26, Syria ranks 35, Iraq ranks 36, Libya ranks 
39, Jordan ranks 43, and Lebanon ranks 52 in the world). 
 58 See Lawrence Wright, The Double Game; The Unintended Consequences of American 
Funding in Pakistan, NEW YORKER, May 16, 2011, at 91. 
 59 See Jayshree Bajoria, The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644 (last 
updated May 4, 2011) (describing the possibly independent involvement of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence in aiding Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda). 
 60 See, e.g., Mumbai Terror Group had Links with Pakistan Intelligence, Chicago Trial 
Told, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/23/ 
mumbai-terror-pakistani-intelligence-headley (discussing the potential links between the 
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and Pakistan’s intelligence agency). 
 61 The Turkish Republic, Recent Developments, COUNTRIESQUEST.COM, http://www. coun-
triesquest.com/middle_east/turkey/history/the_turkish_republic/recent_developments.htm 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 62 See Erdogan’s Landslide, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2011, at 16 (urging “statesmanship” 
despite the ruling party’s near 50% majority). 
File: Guiora 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 8:33:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:44:00 PM 
2011] DECIPHERING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 261 
volvement in the 2010 Gaza Flotilla63 which dramatically impacted long-
standing relations between Turkey and Israel.64 In addition, concern was 
raised in many circles regarding the possible strengthening of ties between 
Turkey and Iran.65 However, the influx of Syrian refugees66 into Turkey and 
the alleged presence of Iranian forces67 in Syria assisting the Syrian gov-
ernment massacre civilians has apparently forced Turkey to re-evaluate its 
relationship both with Syria and Iran. While not suggesting Turkey will re-
engage with the West, it does hint at a re-assessment of where Turkish in-
terests best lie. 
Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability produces constant anxiety in the U.S., 
given U.S. dependence on Saudi oil.68 The continued dependence on oil 
consumption and by extension on Saudi Arabia and the Emirates is one of 
the great failings of 20th century technology. That dependence and the ina-
bility to develop alternative energy sources place the U.S. in a particularly 
precarious position. While the Saudi military is largely dependent on the 
  
 63 See Gaza Aid Flotilla Attack: Obama Speaks to Turkey, TELEGRAPH (June 2, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/7795665/Gaza-
aid-flotilla-attack-Obama-speaks-to-Turkey.html (expressing Obama’s condolences over the 
deaths on the Turkish ships and affirming the importance of finding ways to help the people 
of Gaza without undermining Israel's security); see generally Gaza Flotilla Ship Welcomed 
Back to Turkey by Thousands of Activists, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2010/dec/26/gaza-flotilla-ship-returns-turkey (contrasting the planned 2011 
Gaza Flotilla in which Turkey was not involved); see also Barak Ravid, Turkish Ship In-
volved in Gaza Flotilla Raid Pulls out of Next Convoy, TRUTH FREQUENCY NEWS (June 17, 
2011), http://truthfrequencynews.com/?p=5149l. 
 64 Turkey was often referred to as Israel’s only friend in the Middle East. For ramifications 
to Turkish-Israel relations as a result of the 2010 Gaza Flotilla, see Joshua Mitnick & Scott 
Peterson, Will Gaza Flotilla Raid Mark End of Turkey-Israel Relations?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (June 7, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0607/Will-
Gaza-flotilla-raid-mark-end-of-Turkey-Israel-relations; see also Nichole Sobecki, Will Tur-
key Sever Ties with Israel?, GLOBALPOST (July 17, 2010), http://www.globalpost.com 
/dispatch/turkey/100717/will-turkey-sever-ties-israel. 
 65 Diana Gregor, Strengthening Turkish-Iran Relations Risk UN Sanctions Against the 
Islamic Republic, RÉALITÉ-EU (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.realite-eu.org/site/apps/nlnet 
/content3.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=8104207; Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan 
Strengthen Ties, TEHRAN TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View. 
asp?code=238868. 
 66 Ayla Albayrak, Refugees From Syria Stream Into Turkey, WALL ST. J., at A9; More 
Than 1,000 Syrians Refugees Stream into Turkey Fearing a Massacre, THEJOURNAL.IE (June 
9, 2011), http://www.thejournal.ie/more-than-1000-syrians-refugees-stream-into-turkey-fear 
ing-a-massacre-152624-Jun2011/. 
 67 See Merc, Deja Vu All Over Again, MIDDLE EAST REALITY CHECK BLOG (June 14, 2011 
8:20 AM), http://middleeastrealitycheck.blogspot.com/2011/06/deja-vu-all-over-again.html 
(reporting claims of Iranian involvement in Syria’s crackdown). 
 68 See Tom Doggett, RPT-US Nov Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia Up 32 pct-EIA, 
REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFN282842972011 
0129. 
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U.S.,69 it is an open question as to how it would respond in genuine crises. If 
the 1979 response to the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by 500 
religious extremist opponents of the Saudi regime is any indication,70 Amer-
ican policymakers have legitimate cause for deep concern regarding the 
Saudi regime’s ability to withstand significant internal or external threats. 
Moreover, it is unclear what threat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsu-
la (AQAP), which has established a powerful foothold in Yemen, poses to 
the Saudi regime.71 While future operational goals of al Qaeda’s new lead-
ership are presently unclear, bin Laden believed the Saudi regime to be a 
legitimate target because of the presence of the infidel on sacred soil.72 
Finally, the danger posed by Iran, both regionally and globally, is 
extraordinary. Iran under the Shah was a brutal and repressive regime which 
brooked no dissent. However, unlike the current regime, which is similarly 
brutal and repressive,73 the Shah neither threatened the region nor the world. 
Over the past thirty years the Ayatollah regime has done both, arguably with 
the worst to come. A brief survey is telling: presence of Iranian forces in 
Syria;74 massive supplying of arms to Hezbollah through Syria, the classic 
proxy nation;75 providing arms to Hamas;76 efforts to undermine the Mubar-
  
 69 See Adam Levine, US Plans $60 Billion, 20-year Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia, CNN 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-20/us/us.saudi.arms.deal_1_military-edge-
defense-security-cooperation-agency-sale?_s=PM:US (describing the military and arms 
relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia). 
 70 See Mecca, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/ 
mecca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012); Saudi Arabia: Threats to Internal Security, 
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11664.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
 71 Scott Atran, How Killing Awlaki Affects America, Al Qaeda, and the Arab Spring, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-atran/how-killing-
awlaki-affect_b_990182.html. 
 72 See generally Ahmed S. Hashim, The World According to Usama Bin Laden, 54 NAVAL 
WAR C. REV. 11, (2001) (discussing Osama Bin Laden’s rise to “supervillian” prominence 
over Saddam Hussein); see also Bid Laden’s Fatwa, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR (May 15, 
2007), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1834249/posts (presenting bin Laden’s 
future “war” against the U.S.). 
 73 See Mark D. Wallace, Iran’s Execution Binge, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/06/opinion/la-oe-wallace-cranes-iran-20110706 (“Iran's 
leadership has cracked down hard, instituting a brutal campaign of terror against its own 
people. The most gruesome manifestation of this repression has been a wave of public execu-
tions.”). 
 74 See Amro Ahmad, Iranian Forces in Syria to Help al-Assad Opposition, ASHARQ 
ALAWSAT (May 16, 2011), http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=25193.  
 75 See Esther Pan, Syria, Iran, and the Mideast Conflict, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(July 18, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/iran/syria-iran-mideast-conflict/p11122 (“Hezbollah 
receives some $100 million per year from Tehran, and its Iranian-supplied weaponry is 
transported through Syria to Hezbollah's stronghold in Lebanon's southeast.”). 
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ak regime;77 the presence of Iranian warships in the Mediterranean as a re-
sult of Egyptian permission to pass through the Suez Canal78 and permission 
to dock in Syria;79 unabated efforts to develop nuclear capability.80 
IV. LIBYA AND SYRIA 
With this background in mind we turn our attention to the, perhaps 
unanswerable, riddle of how the U.S. distinguishes between the massacre of 
Libyans by their own government and the massacre of Syrians by their own 
government. With respect to the latter, as the Wall Street Journal comment-
ed, “Mr. Obama has kept a low profile [on Syria] . . . save to repeat his for-
mulation that Mr. Assad ought to lead political reform or ‘get out of the 
way.’”81 The conflicts in both Syria and Libya are domestic in nature; the 
impetus is historical, pent-up enmity for murderous regimes that have bru-
tally repressed civilians for decades. In Libya, Muammar Gadhafi ruled 
  
 76 See Greg Bruno, States Sponsors: Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362 (“U.S. officials say Iran mostly 
backs Islamist groups . . . and Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas . . . .”). 
 77 See Barney Henderson, Hosni Mubarak Resigns: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Hails ‘a New 
Middle East,’ THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/africaandindianocean/egypt/8319200/Hosni-Mubarak-resigns-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-
hails-a-new-Middle-East.html (describing Ahmadinejad’s anti-Mubarak rhetoric and Iranian 
demonstrations against Mubarak).  
 78 See Ernesto Londono & Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Officials Applaud Warships’ Suez 
Transit, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2011, at A6 (describing the February 2011 voyage of the 
Iranian frigate Alvand and an accompanying supply ship through the Suez Canal to a port in 
Latakia, Syria).   
 79 Id.; see also Syria, Iran Sign Naval Training Agreement, XINHUA NEWS (Feb. 27, 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-02/27/c_13751664.htm (describing the 
Iranian ships docking in Latakia and the signing of a training agreement between the two 
nations). 
 80 For discussions of Iran’s nuclear program see Iran’s Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES,  
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_progra
m/index.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2012); Greg Bruno, Iran’s Nuclear Program, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p 
16811; Louis René Beres, The Case for Strikes Against Iran, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 
8, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0508/p09s01-coop.html; Louis René Beres, Ex-
pected Effects of an Iranian Nuclear Attack on Israel, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE MIDDLE E. (June 
5, 2011), http://spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=8115.  
 81 See Assad’s Embassy Raid, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052702303812104576440022654206458.html. Obama to al-Assad: 
Embrace Democracy or ‘Get Out of the Way,’ CNN (May 19, 2011), http://articles. 
cnn.com/2011-05-19/world/syria.unrest_1_syrian-state-television-syrian-people-al-assad?_s 
=PM:WORLD; see Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, White House, in Shift, Turns Against 
Syria Leader, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A4 (articulating the possible change in Obama 
Administration policy). 
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since a successful coup in 1969.82 In Syria, as a result of a coup, Hafez el-
Assad ruled from 1970 till his death in 2000, whereupon his son, Bashar, 
replaced him.83  
The Gadhafi regime had, in addition to brutally repressing its own 
population, engaged the West in terrorist attacks. The 1986 downing of 
PAN AM Flight 106,84 resulting in the deaths of 270 passengers, is but the 
most egregious example; the killing of two U.S. servicemen in a German 
pub85 resulted in President Reagan’s decision to both attack Libyan ships in 
the Gulf of Sidra86 and to target Gadhafi.87 In the twenty five years thereaf-
ter, the U.S. and Libya have had an uneasy relationship which significantly 
improved in 2003 when Gadhafi announced abandonment of his nuclear 
plan.88 While long-considered unpredictable and, arguably, unstable,89 
Gadhafi—since the Lockerbie bombing—had largely withdrawn from con-
frontation with the U.S., posing neither threat nor risk to Americans or 
American assets. Libyan oil reserves are important for Europe, which im-
  
 82 Aidan Lewis, Profile: Muammar Gaddafi, BBC NEWS AFRICA (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12488278. Gadhafi was overthrown by a popular 
uprising and eventually killed on October 20, 2011. New Era, Challenges Loom for Libyans 
Free of Gadhafi, CNN (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/libya-
next/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.  
 83 President Hafez Assad’s eldest son, Basil, was killed in a car accident in 1994. William 
E. Schmidt, Assad’s Son Killed in Auto Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 1994), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1994/01/22/world/assad-s-son-killed-in-an-auto-crash.html. As a result Bashar 
Assad, a trained ophthalmologist, was picked to replace his father. The Ophthalmologist 
Dictator: Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, THE WEEK (May 27, 2011), http://theweek.com/article/ 
index/215645/the-ophthalmologist-dictator-syrias-bashar-al-assad.  
 84 The bombing is commonly referred to as the “Lockerbie Bombing” because the plane 
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. See Colonel Gaddafi ‘Ordered Lockerbie Bombing,’ 
BBC NEWS S. SCOTLAND (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-
scotland-12552587. 
 85 See Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A7.  
 86 Apr. 14, 1986: U.S. Bombs Libya, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/us-bombs-libya (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
 87 See George J. Church, Targeting Gaddafi, TIME (Apr. 21, 1986), http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,961140,00.html.  
 88 See Sammy Salama, Issue Brief: Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success 
for Nonproliferation?, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Sep. 1, 2004), http://www.nti.org/ 
analysis/articles/was-libyan-wmd-disarmament-success/ (“In a stunning declaration on De-
cember 19, 2003, the Libyan government announced its intention to fully disarm its weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal.”).  
 89 See Lee Ferran, Wikileaks on Gadhafi: Very Strange, Very Wily, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/wikileaks-lybia-moammar-gadhafi-strange-wily/story 
?id=12971733 (describing American diplomats’ observance and interpretations of various 
personal quirks and eccentricities of Gadhafi).  
File: Guiora 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 8:33:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:44:00 PM 
2011] DECIPHERING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 265 
ports nearly 85% of the oil produced in Libya.90 Based on totals from earlier 
this year, Libyan oil accounts for the following percentages of European oil 
imports: Italy 22%, Austria 21%, France 16%, Greece 15%, Spain 12%, 
Portugal 11%, United Kingdom 9%, and Germany 8%.91 However, the same 
cannot be said with respect to the U.S. which imports only 0.2% of its oil 
from Libya.92 In other words, America’s relationship with Libya for the past 
25 years is best defined as ‘wary but distant’ with almost no direct mutual 
interests at stake.93 
Various American administrations have, over the years, made ef-
forts to engage the Assad regime in Syria. The truce brokered by Secretary 
of State Kissinger between Israel and Syria in the aftermath of the 1973 
Yom Kippur War94 has held ground; according to reliable reports not one 
violation has been reported by either side.95 Furthermore, Israeli Prime Min-
ister Rabin suggested wide-reaching territorial concessions to President 
Assad including withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the Golan 
Heights96 and re-deployment to the northern edge of the Sea of Galilee 
(Lake Kinneret).97 The Clinton Administration was significantly involved in 
  
 90 Country Analysis Briefs: Libya, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cabs 
/libya/pdf.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011) (“According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) the vast majority (around 85 percent) of Libyan oil exports are sold to European coun-
tries . . . .”). 
 91 See Europe Gets Most of Libya’s Oil Exports, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 22, 2011), http:// 
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2014299479_apusoilpriceslibya.html.  
 92 Petroleum & Other Liquids, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 28, 2011), http://www.eia.gov 
/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?f=a&n=pet&s=mcrimly1. (The U.S. imported 15,608,000 
barrels of oil from Libya in 2010); Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Oil Does the 
United States Consume Per Year?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 6, 2011), http://www.eia.gov 
/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=33&t=6. (The U.S. consumes 6,990,000,000 barrels of oil per year). 
Dividing the number of total barrels consumed by the number of barrels imported from Libya 
produces a percentage figure of 0.2233%. 
 93 For an extensive discussion of U.S.-Libyan relations since Libya became independent in 
1951 see Background Note: Libya, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 7, 2011), http://www.state.gov 
/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm#relations.  
 94 See Separation of Forces Between Israel and Syria, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. 
(May 31, 1974), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process 
/Israel-Syria+Separation+of+Forces+Agreement+-+1974.htm (containing the text of the 
agreement and a description of Secretary Kissinger’s role in the negotiations).  
 95 See Martin Briens, Syria/Israel—UNDOF—Adoption of Resolution 1994, FR. MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFF. (June 30, 2011), http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article_imprim.php3?id_ 
article=15935 (“The ceasefire line between Israel and Syria has been the most stable border 
line in the region since 1974 and the agreement on disengagement.”). 
 96 Israel seized the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 Six Day War. Regions and Terri-
tories: The Golan Heights, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm.  
 97 See The Israel–Syria Negotiations, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 21, 
2008), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20 
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these talks, believing that Syria was a linchpin to peace in the Middle East.98 
Israeli Prime Minister Barak also sought to diplomatically engage Assad 
under the auspices of the Clinton Administration, though ultimately to no 
avail.99 In spite of these failures, the U.S. and Syria enjoyed full diplomatic 
relations, though efforts to engage President Assad in peace talks have thor-
oughly failed.100 
The brutally repressive regime of President Assad (the father) was 
made clear in the 1982 massacre in the Syrian town of Hamma; over 10,000 
citizens were massacred when Assad ordered the Syrian army to squash a 
purported revolt against the regime.101 While the brutal nature of the regime 
(in addition to the Hamma massacre) was well known and documented, 
successive U.S. Presidents turned a “blind eye” in the name of larger inter-
ests and goals.102 In the context of this pragmatic policy, President Assad 
  
Process/Israel-Syria%20Negotiations (describing proposed concession of the Golan 
Heights); Frederic C. Hof, Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel, U.S. INST. PEACE (Mar. 
2009), available at http://library.usip.org/articles/1012101.1042/1.pdf (“Among other things, 
withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, line would give Syria beachfront property on the northeast-
ern quadrant of the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s national reservoir.”). 
 98 In a widely reported incident, President Assad kept U.S. Secretary of State Christopher 
waiting for several hours prior to a previously arranged meeting. Jed Babbin, Regime 
Change, Again: Work Undone in Syria, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 12, 2003), http://old. 
nationalreview.com/babbin/babbin200311120817.asp. 
 99 See CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RES. SERV., FOREIGN AFF., DEF., & TRADE DIV., THE 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS 10 (2003) (detailing the deterioration of discussions between 
President Assad and Prime Minister Barak over several fundamental disagreements).  
100 Compare Background Note: Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www. 
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (noting that the U.S. has resumed diplomatic relations with 
Syria since 2009, and Jim Lobe, Washington Ends Its Diplomatic Embargo, IPSNEWS.NET 
(Mar. 3, 2009), http://ispnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45966 (detailing the thawing of U.S.-
Syrian relations, beginning with the dispatching of two senior officials to Damascus), and 
Holly Fletcher, State Sponsor: Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (last updated Feb. 2008), 
http://www.cfr.org/syria/state-sponsor-syria/p9368 (noting Syria’s status as a state sponsor of 
terror), with A Brief History of U.S.-Syrian Diplomatic Relations, EMBASSY U.S.: DAMASCUS-
SYRIA, http://damascus.usembassy.gov/about_the_embassy.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).    
101 A Look Back at Syria’s 1982 Crackdown, NPR (May 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/ 
2011/05/11/136214343/a-look-back-at-syrias-1982-crackdown; see also Thomas L. Fried-
man, Op-Ed., Hama Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2001, at A35 (describing the repressive 
government strategies of the Assad regime as “Hama Rules,” which provide virtually no 
limitations on subduing opposition groups). 
102 The U.S. applied the same pragmatic philosophy predicated on advancing strategic 
American interests to a wide range of U.S. allies both in the Middle East and world-wide. 
Compare U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Situating Obama, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 767, 
779 (2011) (describing the American political tendency to resort to pragmatism in weighing 
human rights issues against economic relationships) with Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, § 402, 88 Stat. 1978, 2056 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (2006)) 
(noting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s linking of the Soviet Union’s most-favored-nation 
status to human rights and policy-related criteria).  
File: Guiora 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 8:33:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:44:00 PM 
2011] DECIPHERING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 267 
brutalized his people while negotiating with the U.S.; simply put, Syrian 
domestic affairs were an internal matter which the U.S. chose to ignore 
while focusing on broader geo-political considerations.  
The U.S. “blind eye” policy regarding domestic policy—regardless 
of its repressive nature and inevitable human cost—reflects respect for the 
principle of national sovereignty.103 However, as documented above, the 
U.S. has repeatedly violated that principle when broader American interests 
are perceived to be at stake. 
Which brings us to the question: why did the Obama Administra-
tion choose not to intervene in Syria in the spring and summer of 2011? 
How does the Obama Administration distinguish between Syria and Libya? 
Why does the extraordinary violation of human rights in the latter justify 
international intervention whereas the massacre of innocent civilians in the 
former does not? With respect to Syria, the Obama Administration has lim-
ited its response to largely meaningless rhetoric, some of it embarrassingly 
‘distant’ and ‘distracted.’ Secretary of State Clinton’s comments are but a 
telling example: 
“Syria’s future is up to the Syrian people,” she said, “but of course the ef-
forts by the opposition to come together to organize in order to articulate a 
political agenda is an important part of political reform.”
104
 
In both Libya and Syria a brutal regime was deliberately torturing, 
imprisoning and killing its own citizens. In both cases, thousands of citizens 
were forced to flee their homes with the understanding that the regime 
would brook no dissent, giving open fire orders that enabled indiscriminate 
shooting by its army into crowds of individuals. In other words, both re-
gimes were engaged in massacring their citizens. While tragically not a new 
development in the Middle East, the confluence of the Arab Spring, social 
media,105 and heightened international focus on the region drew greater me-
dia and public scrutiny regarding both regimes. 
  
103 The protection of national sovereignty is a dominant theme in international relations and 
the development of international law. See generally G.A. Res. 50/172, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/50/172 (Dec. 22, 1995) (affirming the principle of national sovereignty in electoral 
processes for protecting human rights); see also G.A. Res. 56/154, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/154 
(Feb. 13, 2002) (emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty and non-interference 
regarding internal electoral processes). 
104 Sebnem Arsu, Clinton Chides Turkey on Rights Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at 
A10.   
105 See William Halal, The Arab Spring and the Technology Revolution, WORLD FUTURE 
SOCIETY (May 27, 2011), http://www.wfs.org/content/arab-spring-and-technology-revolution 
(recognizing the major role information technology, namely social media, played in acceler-
ating the Arab Spring). 
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In Libya, opponents of the regime took to the streets; while uncer-
tainty existed regarding both the identity and organization of the rebels,106 
the Obama Administration107 and NATO decided to intervene militarily on 
their behalf.108 In deciding to intervene, the U.S.109 and NATO directly en-
gaged110 the Gadhafi regime, with the former bearing the brunt of the re-
sponsibility.111 By the end of the month of August 2011, the U.S. had flown 
5,316 sorties since April 1, a total that included 1,210 airstrike missions and 
101 Predator drone strike missions.112 In addition, the U.S. was providing 
nearly 70% of the intelligence capabilities and refueling assets,113 and by 
July 31, 2011, had spent over $896 million since the intervention began.114 
  
106 See Andy Stone, Who Are Libya’s Rebels?, NOLANCHART.COM (Mar. 19, 2011),  
http://www.nolanchart.com/article8465_Who_are_Libya's_rebels.html (asserting that the 
rebels’ identity is still unknown, however, Libyan rebels are grounded in principles of reli-
gious fundamentalism rather than liberal democracy). 
107 President Obama deployed U.S. military forces to Libya without receiving congression-
al authorization under the 1973War Powers resolution. See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, 
White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, 
at A16 (“U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with 
hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops,” rendering War Powers authorization 
unnecessary in the eyes of the Administration); see also Paul Starobin, Op-Ed., A Moral 
Flip-Flop? Defining ‘War,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at SR5 (illustrating the issue of fram-
ing the Libyan intervention through a critical examination of Department of State Legal 
Adviser Harold Koh’s position on the applicability of the War Powers resolution). 
108 See Paula Newton, NATO: Libya Mission Will Be to Protect, Not Arm, CNN (Mar. 28, 
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-28/world/libya.nato_1_nato-civilians-libya-mission? 
_s=PM:WORLD (indicating that NATO’s control of the Libyan operation increased during 
its early stages). 
109 See Missy Ryan & Alister Bull, Obama Says U.S. Role Limited as Libya Strikes Start, 
REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/20/uk-libya-usa-idUKTRE 
72I47920110320 (indicating that despite the Obama Administration’s state intent of having a 
limited military role in Libya, the United States initially dominated Libyan military opera-
tions). 
110 See Josh Rogin, Exclusive: Top U.S. Admiral Admits We Are Trying to Kill Qaddafi, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 24, 2011), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/24/exclu 
sive_top_us_admiral_admits_we_are_trying_to_kill_qaddafi (describing the joint U.S.-
NATO mission objective of locating and eliminating Gadhafi). 
111 See Daniel Sagalyn, U.S. Forces Lead Attack Against Libya in Operation ‘Odyssey 
Dawn,’ PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 19, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/run 
down/2011/03/us-forces-lead-attack-against-libya-in-operation-audacity-dawn.html. 
112 Luis Martinez, US Military Intervention in Libya Cost At Least $896 Million, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/08/us-military-inter 
vention-in-libya-cost-at-least-896-million-.html (tallying total cost as of Aug. 22, 2011). 
113 United States Activities in Libya, FOREIGN POL’Y 9, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files 
/fp_uploaded_documents/110615_United_States_Activities_in_Libya_--_6_15_11.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2012) (providing a detailed overview of American operations in Libya com-
piled by the White House). 
114 Martinez, supra note 112. 
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U.S. government projections estimated that by September 30, 2011, the total 
U.S. Department of Defense expense of the intervention would reach $1.104 
billion.115  
The stated purpose of the military engagement was to force Gadhafi 
to either step down or leave Libya;116 that mission has been accomplished. 
That achievement, however, does not resolve the core question this article 
seeks to address. 
In stark contrast, while the U.S. forces engaged Libyan forces, Pres-
ident Assad continues—unabated and unhindered—to massacre innocent 
Syrians.117 The Syrian opposition118 does not seem to be organized, in con-
trast to Libyan rebels; similarly, the former do not appear to be armed to the 
extent the latter are.119 However, in both cases the regime is directly engag-
ing in the massacre of civilians; doubtlessly, some have taken up arms 
against the government whereas others are innocent victims of a brutal re-
gime. There is a distinct difference between the Syrian opposition and Liby-
an rebels: the former are not organized and are seemingly poorly armed (at 
best) whereas the latter are organized and have been able to sufficiently arm 
  
115 United States Activities in Libya, supra note 113, at 14–15 (basing this projection on 
actual U.S. expenditures of approximately $715 million through June 3, 2011). 
116 Compare James Rowley, Top U.S. Republicans Question Purpose and Goals of Libya 
Military Mission, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
23/boehner-presses-obama-on-contradiction-between-u-s-un-goals-for-libya.html (noting 
President Obama’s statement at the outset of the Libyan operation indicating regime change 
was a key mission objective), with Rogin, supra note 110 (describing the joint U.S.-NATO 
mission objective of locating and eliminating Gadhafi). 
117 See Syria Unrest: Hama Army Raid Kills Dozens, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (July 31, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-14356722 (noting that while president Obama 
condemns the Syrian government’s use of violence against civilians, the U.S. is engaging 
Syria in military action); see also Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syrian Forces Press Hama Assault 
into Ramadan, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-syria-
idUSTRE76T02020110801 (noting many civilian deaths attributed to the Syrian govern-
ment); Nada Bakri, Syrian Tanks Move in to Retake Rebellious City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2011, at A1 (discussing international condemnation of the Syrian offensive, in particular 
from Syria’s neighbor Turkey). 
118 See Suleiman al-Khan & Simon Cameron-Moore, Syria Opposition Group Form Coun-
cil to Counter Assad, REUTERS (July 16, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/16 
/us-syria-opposition-council-idUSTRE76F1W320110716 (describing how initial efforts to 
unite Syrian factions were impeded by sectarian sensitivities and fears); Katherine Zoepf, 
Long Repressed in Syria, an Internal Opposition Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at 
A12; Anthony Shadid, Syrian Military Mounts Assault on Another City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2011, at A12 (noting the independent character of the opposition tribes of eastern Syria). 
119 See Chris Keeler, Moving Towards Civil War in Syria, A LOOK AT THE MIDDLE E. (June 
7, 2011), http://notesfromamedinah.com/2011/06/07/moving-towards-civil-war-in-syria/ 
(distinguishing Libya, where weapons were abundantly available to opposition forces, from 
Syria, where weaponry is substantially more scarce). 
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themselves overthrow120 the Gadhafi regime. The same cannot be said for 
the Syrian opposition; the contrast is particularly compelling and tragic for 
Syrian refugees, who are literally pouring into Turkey in an effort to escape 
their own army.121 
The dichotomy, then, is clear: an organized rebel group is receiving 
significant international military assistance; an unorganized opposition has 
barely received the traditional platitudes that accompany non-intervention in 
the face of extraordinary violations of human rights. Declarations that the 
Syrian regime has lost legitimacy122 are true, but they are just that, declara-
tions; devoid of intervention, they are akin to whistling in the wind. That, 
however, is the essence of the Obama Administration’s policy with respect 
to Syria: mere words. Needless to say, that is a far cry from the aggressive 
intervention policy with respect to Libya. A Syrian escaping into Turkey 
just meters ahead of a Syrian bulldozer must be dumbfounded to hear the 
language of President Obama’s Cairo speech123 and to see the U.S. air force 
aggressively attack Libyan targets. 
Herein lies the rub: a compelling argument can be made that unor-
ganized Syrians are in greater need of international intervention than orga-
nized Libyan rebels. That is, the U.S. and NATO have deliberately turned 
their back on the citizens of one country while readily coming to the assis-
tance of the citizens of another country. Similarities far outweigh differ-
ences: two brutal regimes in the Middle East attacking their citizens in the 
shadow of the Arab Spring, and yet two distinct approaches. While the po-
litical considerations—Administration comments notwithstanding—are 
  
120 Libyan Opposition Claims Major Gains, AL JAZEERA (July 21, 2011), http://english. 
aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/07/201172161918114981.html (noting that Libya’s opposi-
tion fighters have made significant territorial gains); Libyan Opposition Gains as Casualties 
Rise, INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.investigative  
project.org/2622/libyan-opposition-gains-as-casualties-rise (indicating that despite rising 
casualties, Libyan opposition forces were successfully consolidating control over the coun-
try). 
121 The Syrian-Turkish border is worth closely watching; it is unclear what the response of 
the Turkish army would be if the Syrian army at the border to aggressively prevent additional 
Syrian’s from flooding into Turkey. See Owen Bennett-Jones, Syria Crisis: Refugees in 
Turkey Fear for Jisr al-Shughour, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (June 9, 2011), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13714168 (highlighting the exodus of Syrian refugees into 
Turkey). 
122 See Clinton Says Assad Has ‘Lost Legitimacy,’ AL JAZEERA (July 12, 2011), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/201171204030379613.html (stating that 
the U.S. has nothing invested in Assad remaining in power); US Senators: Syria’s Assad Has 
Lost His Legitimacy, YALIBNAN (May 12, 2011), http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/05/12/us-
senators-syria%E2%80%99s-assad-has-lost-his-legitimacy/ (describing how U.S. condemna-
tion has evolved into a Senate resolution calling for “tough” action against the Syrian gov-
ernment). 
123 New Beginning Speech, supra note 4. 
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unclear, it is to the principle of humanitarian intervention that this article 
now turns. 
V. LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION  
As Professor Ryan Goodman asked, “Should international law per-
mit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or comparable atrocity 
without Security Council authorization?”124 According to Article 39, Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommen-
dations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Arti-
cles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
125
 
While the U.N. authorized military force against Libya,126 it has not 
done so regarding Syria.127 Does that mean the U.S. cannot intervene in 
Syria? As Professor Goodman and others have written,128 international hu-
manitarian intervention raises legitimate questions regarding pretext to 
“wage wars for ulterior motives.”129 From the perspective of international 
law, a discussion regarding international humanitarian intervention requires 
carefully analyzing the relationship between national sovereignty, interna-
tional responsibility, and grave violations of human rights. The pretext ar-
gument suggested by Professor Goodman is of justifiable concern when 
examining specific examples of intervention; in the two examples discussed 
  
124 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
107, 107 (2006). 
125 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
126 Jay Solomon, Adam Entous & Joe Lauria, U.N. Clears Way for Attack on Libya, WALL 
ST. J. (May 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870381820457620637 
3350344478.html (noting that the U.N. Security Council authorized military force against 
Libya). 
127 U.N. Security Council Issues Statement Condemning Violence in Syria, CNN (Aug. 3, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/08/03/syria.unrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1 
(noting that thus far, the U.N. Security Council has only issued a statement condemning the 
violence in Syria).  
128 Goodman, supra note 124; see, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in Interna-
tional Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321 (2011) (purporting that there has been an unnoticed 
change in international regulatory law allowing for states who treat their citizens improperly 
to come under international scrutiny); Jonah Eaton, An Emerging Norm? Determining the 
Meaning of Legal Status of the Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765 (2011) 
(discussing the emerging norm in the U.N. General Assembly to protect during humanitarian 
intervention); Nicholas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New 
War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 225 
(2011) (arguing that modern new wars pose challenges to international humanitarian law). 
129 Goodman, supra note 124. 
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in this essay, the application of international humanitarian intervention prin-
ciples reflects the inconsistency previously referenced. 
Humanitarian intervention is an inherently complicated proposition, 
because it clearly implies both that nation state ‘A’ is engaged in significant 
violations of the human rights of its own citizens, requiring nation state ‘B’ 
and/or the international community to recognize that intervention is essen-
tial.130 However, analysis of when intervention is deemed essential and cri-
teria justifying intervention suggest an enormous lack of clarity and lack of 
objective standards and benchmarks.  
The lack of clear criteria as to when intervention is justified, if not 
required, suggests that the question is one of interpretation, subject to spe-
cific circumstances and particular interests.131 In that vein, then, the ques-
tion—relevant to the discussion of this essay—is: why does the U.S. not 
determine that the actions of the Syrian government justify international 
humanitarian intervention? As of January 2012, the Syrian death toll was 
estimated to exceed five thousand people.132 In addition to the rising death 
toll, anywhere between 15,000 to 40,000 protestors have been reported 
missing or in Syrian custody since the protests began.133 In fact, a high-level 
U.N. human rights team recently released a report finding systematic human 
rights violations by the Syrian government, including summary executions, 
prisoner torture, and targeting children during the government’s crackdown 
on opposition protestors.134 Based on its findings, the U.N. team ultimately 
  
130 See Learn about the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L 
COAL. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-
coalition (last visited July 14, 2011) (detailing an effort to impose a normative standard for 
demanding preventative intervention). 
131 Compare Chris Borgen, The “Libya and Humanitarian Intervention” Meme, OPINIO 
JURIS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/24/the-libya-and-humanitarian-interv 
ention-meme/ (compiling internet responses related to the humanitarian intervention in Lib-
ya), and Asli Ü. Bali & Ziad Abu-Rish, On International Intervention and the Dire Situation 
in Libya, JADALIYYA (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/725/on-inter 
national-intervention-and-the-dire-situation-in-libya (advocating for solutions to the situation 
and Libya and describing the condemnation of the violence in Libya), with Issandr El 
Amrani, A Different Take On Foreign Intervention in Libya, ARABIST (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/2/24/a-different-take-on-foreign-intervention-in-libya.html 
(opposing foreign military intervention), with Shadi Hamid, Libya Uprising: It’s Time to 
Intervene, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/2286184/ (giving the international 
community options for supporting a regime change in Libya).   
132 Syria – Protests, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countries 
andterritories/syria/index.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2012). 
133 Id. 
134 U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/53; 
GAOR, 18th Sess. (Sept. 15, 2011) (listing human rights violations in Syria); see also Frank 
Jordans, U.N. Syria Mission Finds Systematic Human Rights Violations, HUFFINGTON POST 
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recommended that Syria be referred to the International Criminal Court for 
prosecution of the alleged atrocities.135 By comparison, the Libyan death toll 
was estimated at over 1,000 on February 23, 2011,136 only weeks before the 
U.N. authorized intervention in Libya137 and NATO began flying sorties 
over the country.138 
Precisely because international law does not articulate either norma-
tive or architectural standards as to when international humanitarian inter-
vention is justified, national leaders arguably have a responsibility to act.139 
The oft-cited phrase “when the cannons roar, the muses are silent”140 is par-
ticularly relevant to this discussion. For a variety of reasons, the internation-
al community has determined—whether actively or passively—that the 
massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad government does not justify 
international humanitarian intervention. While the human rights violations 
occurring on a daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda,141 Ko-
sovo,142 or Sierra Leone143 they are not less compelling than the events tran-
  
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/un-syria-hman-rights_n_ 
930577.html. 
135 See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 134, ¶ 94(c); see also Jordans, supra note 
134. 
136 Rachel Donadio, Italy Says Death Toll Is Likely Over 1,000, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/europe/24italy.html.   
137 Dan Bilefsky & Mark Landler, Military Action Against Qaddafi is Backed by U.N., 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2011, at A1.   
138 Libya Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS AFRICA, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/13984 
37.stm (last updated Dec. 1, 2011) (chronicling the start of NATO airstrikes in Mar. 2011). 
139 See Jayshree Bajoria, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480 (stating if 
a state fails to protect its citizens from genocide or other war crimes, it becomes the interna-
tional community’s responsibility to do so); Irwin Cotler & Jared Genser, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/ 
opinion/01iht-edcotler01.html?_r=2 (authorizing action from the international community to 
protect a state’s population from genocide or other war crimes if that state is unable or un-
willing to protect its citizens, or if that state is the perpetrator of such actions at a U.N. world 
summit in 2005);  The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www. 
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) (discuss-
ing alleged human rights violations by the Syrian government and calling for intervention by 
the international community). 
140 CICERO, PRO MILONE 11 (A.B. Poynton ed., 2nd ed. 1902). 
141 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: 
Kosovo, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009 
/af/135971.htm. 
142 The death toll in Kosovo was estimated between 5,000 and 12,000. See Q & A Counting 
Kosovo’s Dead, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/517168.stm. 
For a more recent report, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human 
Rights Report: Kosovo, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
hrrpt/2009/eur/136039.htm. 
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spiring in Libya. If, by metaphorical analogy, the international community 
is the cannons and the U.S. is the muse, does that mean that the Obama 
Administration is required to be silent? After all, if the quote were to be 
rigorously applied, then many of the institutions created to minimize human 
suffering would neither exist, much less function in wartime.144 While the 
distinction—from the perspective of international humanitarian interven-
tion—between Libya and Syria is as unclear, as are the criteria that justify 
intervention, that must not serve as a misguided basis for the Obama Ad-
ministration to largely turn its back on the Syrian people. 
VI. FINAL WORD 
The lack of precise international law criteria articulating when in-
tervention is mandated must not serve as a convenient ‘out’ for the U.S. As 
described in detail above, the Middle East is presently in a state of extraor-
dinary flux; uncertainty and dramatic change are the contemporary reality. 
Inherent to those is danger, significant human rights violations, and remark-
able instability. In addition, a direct result of President Obama’s Cairo 
speech and subsequent comments is the expectation that the U.S. will play a 
decisive role in the Middle East, reflecting attitudes and philosophies dis-
tinct from previous administrations. And yet, when given the opportunity to 
decisively and consistently act in a region of the world whose primary char-
acteristics are instability and inconsistency, President Obama—in the Syrian 
context—blinked.  
The Arab world’s profound disappointment with President 
Obama145 is, frankly, justified and disconcerting. President Obama has no 
one to blame but himself for this development. The disappointment is justi-
fied because, as the phrase goes, the bigger the expectation, the bigger the 
disappointment; it is disconcerting because there is no vacuum in the Mid-
dle East and powerful voices and forces of violence pose a threat to the re-
gion and world alike. Inconsistent foreign policy—particularly in a region 
of the world as volatile as the Middle East—is a luxury U.S. interests cannot 
brook. In other words, the law’s uncertainty does not justify policy incon-
  
143 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: 
Sierra Leone, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
2009/af/135975.htm. 
144 See generally Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: President Barak’s 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. 
REV. 51 (2005) (addressing the role of judicial review in times of conflict). 
145 See Glenn Greenwald, US More Unpopular in the Arab World than Under Bush, SALON 
(July 13, 2011), http://www.salon.com/news/middle_east/index.html?story=/opinion/green 
wald/2011/07/13/arabs (describing unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S. during the Obama 
administration when favorable attitudes dropped to levels lower than they were during the 
last year of the Bush Administration).   
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sistency, particularly when Syrian citizens are suffering no less than Libyan 
citizens. In both paradigms, two repressive, historically brutal regimes that 
have long violated basic human rights are, once again, killing their own 
citizens. And yet, the powerful similarities notwithstanding, the Obama 
Administration has adopted two distinct responses to what are, in essence, 
mirror paradigms. 
In the context of providing much needed—actually critically re-
quired—humanitarian intervention, the President has failed the Syrian peo-
ple. While the Administration has intensified its rhetoric146 regarding the 
Syrian regime, words do not, and never have, provided actual assistance to 
those subjected to indiscriminate open fire orders with live ammunition. 
Perhaps words may satisfy the speaker, but to the victims, they are just 
words. While they can create expectation, and subsequent disappointment, 
they are not a substitute for action. 
Some will query, and legitimately so, why it is the U.S. that must 
come to the assistance of the Syrian population. Obviously, the French and 
British have the capability, resources and historical relationship to the Mid-
dle East. However, neither President Sarkozy nor Prime Minister Cameron 
promised the people of the Middle East a new dawn; neither stood in Cairo 
and created the expectations that President Obama did. In addition—as a 
reality of contemporary geo-politics—in the aftermath of the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall, there is only one superpower in the world today. To be a super-
power requires both military and moral leadership.  
Criteria regarding international humanitarian intervention are un-
clear; however, the situation in Syria is clear. Nevertheless, the ambiguity 
surrounding whether/when a domestic crisis justifies international humani-
tarian intervention need not contribute to policy that is clearly at logger-
heads with itself. That is, while the law is unclear, President Obama’s polic-
es are similarly unclear. What is clear, however, is that the Syrian govern-
ment is massacring its citizens in a manner similar to the Libyan govern-
ment. Evidently, the similarity ends there, for the actions of the Obama 
Administration are fundamentally different with respect to the two coun-
  
146 See Elizabeth Flock, Obama: Syria’s Assad Must Go, WASH. POST BLOGS (Aug. 18, 
2011, 12:57 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/obama-it-is-time-for-
syrias-assad-to-go/2011/08/18/gIQABPVpNJ_blog.html (explaining that President Obama 
issued a symbolic statement followed by a more meaningful executive order); Joshua Hersh, 
Obama: Syrian President Assad Must Step Down, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/08/18/obama-assad_n_930229.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2011) (recounting 
President Obama’s demand that President Assad step down); Obama: Syria Must Stop ‘Mur-
der and Mass Arrest’ of Citizens, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news 
/world-us-canada-13464011 (presenting President Obama’s call for Assad to allow for peace-
ful protests); Another Obama Warning On Syria: ‘I Am Appalled,’ L.A. TIMES (July 31, 
2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/07/obama-syria-violence.html (re-
printing statement by President Obama).  
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tries. Needless to say, that is the President’s prerogative; nevertheless, the 
dissonance is jarring, both philosophically and practically.  
Deciphering the President’s policy is proving as complicated as es-
tablishing international standards justifying intervention. However, while 
the former can be subject to continuous academic debate, the human rights 
violations that define Syria today cannot be addressed by mere rhetoric, 
even if forceful. The President has an opportunity to apply the principles of 
international humanitarian intervention in a manner that will restore confi-
dence in his leadership and set a clear example of consistency and stability. 
That is particularly important in a region of the world that is, at the moment, 
a most dangerous powder keg of extraordinary instability and danger. 
 
